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Abstract
European Union (EU) climate politics have polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands out as the EUmember
state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU’s level of ambition, stirring some turbu‐
lence in EU climate politics. Yet, with the publication of the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2019, the European Commission
has likewise created turbulence in the Polish parliament’s climate debate. This article analyses those debates and identi‐
fies three distinct policy narratives: Poland is in a unique situation, Poland pursues an alternative pathway, and climate
policy endangers competitiveness. The alternative pathway narrative, which advocates for the continued use of coal while
capturing emissions, faded at roughly the same time when the EGD was proposed at the EU level. Simultaneously, the
unique situation narrative, which calls for recognition of Poland’s uniqueness in combination with increased (financial)
support, became stronger. The analysis confirms the dominance of the governing party’s narratives, but contrary to previ‐
ous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right‐wing political parties, on the one hand, and
the centre‐right and centre‐left parties, on the other.
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1. Introduction
European Union (EU) climate politics have become
polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands
out as the EU member state that has most vehemently
opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU’s level
of ambition, creating some turbulence in EU climate pol‐
itics. Through this, Poland has shaped EU climate pol‐
icy, but it has not succeeded in reducing its overall level
of ambition. Nonetheless, it has left its imprint on fea‐
tures of not only EU climate policy but also the broader
European Green Deal (EGD), most notably but not exclu‐
sively the Just Transition Fund. To understand and explain
Poland’s behaviour of unsettling EU climate politics, this
article delves into Polish parliamentary debates on cli‐
mate policy between 2015 and 2020. It analyses how
Polish parliamentarians and government representatives
who were invited to speak in parliament advocate and
justify their policy positions, and the climate policy nar‐
ratives they construct. The analysis identifies three policy
narratives that mark discussion in the Polish parliament:
Poland is in a unique situation, Poland pursues an alterna‐
tive pathway, and climate policy endangers competitive‐
ness. The analysis confirms the dominance of the govern‐
ing party’s narratives, but contrary to previous studies,
detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between
the right‐wing political parties, on the one hand, and the
centre‐right and centre‐left parties, on the other.
Since the 1990s, the EU has gradually devel‐
oped and increased its climate policy’s level of ambi‐
tion. In December 2019, the European Commission
President von der Leyen ramped up ambitions—
thereby creating some turbulence in EU climate policy—
when the European Commission published the EGD
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Communication (European Commission, 2019). The EGD
is a comprehensive action plan to make the EU’s econ‐
omy sustainable. It pursues the overarching goal of cli‐
mate neutrality by 2050, ratcheting up previous EU tar‐
gets. The EGD’s goal of raising the EU’s climate ambition
from the previous 40 percent target to 55 percent by
2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, requires an increase
in investments and political will. The EGD announcement
was followed by the Covid‐19 crisis shortly afterwards.
This created a turbulence and intensified the initial EGD
challenge: Fundamentally changing the EU economy and
increasing investments to achieve climate neutrality by
2050 in times of recovery fromeconomic hardship due to
Covid‐19. Turning environmental and climate challenges
into opportunities requires political commitment by all
EU member states. Even if many laws are decided by
qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU, the
European Council decides the political guidelines by con‐
sensus. Moreover, EU climate policy needs to be trans‐
posed into member state policy, which is difficult when
the government does not support the overall EU goals.
This article focuses on the policy narratives deployed
in Poland’s lower house Sejm to generate a better under‐
standing of the underlying rationale of potential clashes
between Poland and the European Commission/other
member states. Analysing Poland’s narratives on EU cli‐
mate policy can help us understand why it resists EU
goals and how policy objectives could otherwise be
aligned. Policy narratives construct reality in different
ways and reveal the meaning that individuals or groups
attach to a specific policy. Different narratives lead to
different policy outputs (Shanahan et al., 2018). Policy
narratives thus go beyond observing facts to explain
interests. Instead, they are a strategic construction of
those facts by highlighting some aspectswhile neglecting
others. This article’s analysis therefore goes beyond the
observation that Poland depends highly on coal for its
electricity production—which to a great extent is mined
domestically—and that transitioning out of coal is a great
structural challenge, requiring massive investments in
new infrastructure while at the same time accounting for
the social impacts. It focuses on how Polish politicians
advocate and justify their policy positions and what cli‐
mate policy narratives they construct to do so. The study
covers the period 2015–2020 to observe the stability and
change of narratives in response to turbulence, in partic‐
ular the EGD. 2015 coincides with the taking office of the
Law and Justice (PiS) government, a right‐wing populist
party (Zuk & Szulecki, 2020).
The article contributes an in‐depth analysis of the
climate policy narratives used within the Polish parlia‐
mentary debate to improve our understanding of Polish
political actions and their underlying rationale. Most aca‐
demic studies analyse the Polish governments’ activities
at the EU level, while only few studies unpack domes‐
tic dynamics and details of the Polish debate. Zuk et al.
(2021) focus on citizens’ attitudes towards the use of
coal, while Zuk and Szulecki (2020) analyse the Polish
right‐wing populist media’s discourse on energy transi‐
tion. Marcinkiewicz and Tosun (2015) focus on politi‐
cians and show that despite the growing salience of
climate policy in the Polish parliament, there was no
polarisation among political parties that would have
shifted their positions further apart from each other.
They rather remained uniform in opposing ambitious cli‐
mate policy. My analysis starts when Marcinkiewicz and
Tosun’s (2015) study ends—in the year 2015—providing
a continuation of their research and conducting a qual‐
itative content analysis of speeches by Members of the
Polish Parliament’s lower house. The analysis contributes
to existing literature with its qualitative analysis of policy
narratives that captures the nuances of argumentative
patterns. So far, no analysis has specifically identified the
different policy narratives.
The next section describes Poland’s situation with
regards to ambitious climate policy, the EGD, and polar‐
isation among political parties on the issue. This is fol‐
lowed by an analytical framework to guide the system‐
atic analysis of the narratives that actors use to argue
for their policy preferences in Sejm debates. Section 4
describes the research design and method. The subse‐
quent section presents the identified Polish policy nar‐
ratives on the transition to a climate‐neutral economy.
Three distinct narratives were identified which portray
Poland’s situation as unique, postulate that Poland pur‐
sues an alternative pathway, and which see climate pol‐
icy as a threat to competitiveness. Contrary to previous
studies, the findings show nascent polarisation on cli‐
mate policy between the right‐wing political parties, on
the one hand, and the centre‐right and centre‐left par‐
ties, on the other. The concluding section discusses the
results and places them in the broader context of the
EGD and turbulent governance.
2. Poland, the European Green Deal, and Polarisation
Poland is highly dependent on domestically produced
coal for its electricity production, which poses a huge
challenge for transitioning to climate neutrality and
raises energy security concerns. It therefore does not
come as a surprise that Poland has developed a track
record of opposing EU climate policy decisions. This sec‐
tion first sketches Poland’s main challenges with regards
to the climate neutrality transition to provide the facts
based on which the policy narratives are constructed.
Then, it briefly introduces the EGD to highlight the tur‐
bulence it introduced before moving to a review of previ‐
ous research on domestic climate policy polarisation to
which this study aims to contribute.
2.1. Poland’s Climate Challenge
Poland is the EU member state with the most carbon‐
intensive electricity sector due to the large share of
coal in its energy mix. In 2019, more than 72 percent
of Polish electricity was produced from hard coal and
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lignite, which in fact was a decrease from previous years
(Zuk et al., 2021, p. 2). Coal is not only a sensitive
issue because of this large share of the energy mix but
also because most of the coal is mined domestically.
Eighty‐six percent of EU coal production takes place in
Poland (Zuk et al., 2021, p. 2). Moreover, the Polish coal
sector depends on government subsidies and the grid
infrastructure is poor, requiring investment (Brauers &
Oei, 2020, p. 5). This raises questions of energy secu‐
rity. Poland’s future energy mix needs to be reliable,
and concerns about renewables’ volatility frequently are
raised in the political debate. Moreover, due to politi‐
cal and historical reasons, dependence on Russian gas—
a fossil fuel that emits fewer greenhouse gases (GHGs)
than coal—is a situation that the country strictly aims to
avoid. Those factors explain the massive challenge that
Poland faces with regards to climate policy. If it wants to
transition out of coal, the country needs to make enor‐
mous investments in its electricity production and trans‐
mission infrastructure. Additionally, a significant num‐
ber of workers depend directly or indirectly on the coal
sector, which means that cushioning the social impact
is difficult but highly important. Further, due to subsi‐
dies, electricity prices are relatively low. If new invest‐
ments lead to price increases, the social impact could
move beyond coal workers and extend to low‐income
households. Considering those factors, Brauers and Oei
(2020, p. 1) conclude that Poland requires climate poli‐
cies that are “implemented jointly with social and struc‐
tural policy measures, addressing a just transition for the
affected regions in line with the vision of a ‘European
Green Deal.’”
Transforming Poland’s energy sector is further com‐
plicated by the close entanglement between the gov‐
ernment and the coal sector. State‐owned energy com‐
panies were merged with some of the coal mining
companies to rescue them from bankruptcy (Brauers
& Oei, 2020), simultaneously linking energy companies’
interests to that of the coal industry while also mak‐
ing the government partial owners of coal companies.
In addition, the miners’ unions have a particularly strong
political influence (Brauers & Oei, 2020). As a general
tendency, the Polish government has upheld a position
very close to the interests of industry and large GHG
emitters (Jankowska, 2011, p. 171). These structural fac‐
tors can explain that when implementing the EU’s cli‐
mate policy for 2020—which was adopted in 2008—
Poland resisted implementing renewable energy policy
and instead made it fit with its coal‐related interests.
These experiences led to continued Polish opposition to
ambitious EU climate policy for 2030 due to negative
policy feedback and path dependency (Skjærseth, 2018,
pp. 509–510).
2.2. EU Climate Policy and the European Green Deal
Although it was joined by other Central and Eastern
European member states on several issues, Poland
stands out as the EU member state that most often
opposed EU climate policy decisions and consistently dis‐
sented from the majority position in the Council of the
European Union (Ćetković & Buzogány, 2019). The coun‐
try has become overtly assertive, stressing its reliance on
coal and defending its vital national interest (Bocquillon
&Maltby, 2017, p. 94). So far, this has not hindered EU cli‐
mate policy from moving forward, but it has shaped ele‐
ments of its design. Initiatives such as the Just Transition
Fund can, in part, be seen as a response to Polish con‐
cerns for requiring support to tackle the challenge.
At the EU level, several financial instruments directly
or indirectly aim to support Poland and other EU mem‐
ber states in their transition to a climate‐neutral econ‐
omy. The EGD includes a Just Transition Mechanism,
which provides support to mobilise at least 150 bil‐
lion euros during the period 2021–2027 to address the
transition’s social and economic effects. Its three pillars
are: a Just Transition Fund, the InvestEU Just Transition
scheme, and European Investment Bank public sector
loans. The Just Transition Fund provides grants to coal
regions for economic diversification in their transition
away from coal. This includes the reskilling of work‐
ers and assuring their active participation in design‐
ing the transition process. The InvestEU scheme sup‐
ports energy and transport infrastructure investments.
European Investment Bank loans also cover investments
in energy and transport infrastructure while also cov‐
ering energy efficiency measures. Already prior to the
EGD, there was a fund aiming to support investment in
EU member states’ old infrastructure as part of the EU
Emissions Trading System. The Modernisation Fund is
fed by two percent of the allowance auction revenues.
This fund is a solidarity mechanism to help the mem‐
ber states with the greatest challenges and was adopted
as the result of Poland’s and other Central and Eastern
European countries’ demands for their energy situation
duly to be considered (Skjærseth, 2018). In addition to
those funding schemes specifically dedicated to a just
transition, Poland receives significant amounts of EU
funding from the post‐Covid‐19 recovery package and
EU cohesion funds. This creates a formidable opportu‐
nity to invest in transforming the country’s electricity pro‐
duction, among other infrastructure investments. While
there are some rules for the kinds of investment that can
be made with the recovery funds, it is up to Poland and
the other member states to determine how to use the
grants and loans.
2.3. Climate Policy Polarisation in Poland
Looking at the political dynamics within Poland, research
on climate policy polarisation remains inconclusive.
While Marcinkiewicz and Tosun (2015) find that politi‐
cal parties did not polarise on climate policy, Zuk et al.
(2021) find that public opinion about transitioning out
of coal runs along political ideology lines: Supporters
of the right‐wing parties Law and Justice (PiS) and
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 391–400 393
Confederation (Konfederacja) plead to maintain the sta‐
tus quo, while backers of centre and liberal parties sup‐
port the energy transition and climate policy. However,
according to Zuk et al.’s survey, citizens agree across polit‐
ical party lines that the transition to clean energy of the
Upper Silesian region—the largest coal basin in Europe—
should be supported financially by the government (Zuk
et al., 2021). My analysis contributes to these stud‐
ies on domestic climate policy polarisation by analysing
parliamentary debates since 2015. It delves into the
details of policy narratives that political actors construct
to justify their policy position, an analysis that—to my
knowledge—has not yet been conducted.
Since the transition to climate neutrality requires pro‐
found economic and societal changes, it creates win‐
ners and losers, similar to the trends of globalisation
(Koopmans & Zürn, 2019). This can widen cleavages
within societies and among countries. Whether and how
to remedy this development is subject to much political
debate and polarisation. Polarisation is defined as a pro‐
cess when positions drift apart towards more extremes
(deWilde et al., 2016). Political parties can drift apart on
their position of how climate policy should be designed
and also on the relationship between climate policy, on
the one hand, and economic growth and social pros‐
perity, on the other. In a polarised debate, opposite
arguments tend to be made. One typical discussion in
climate policy is whether it is an opportunity to cre‐
ate new jobs and economic growth, or whether it is a
threat to economic competitiveness and people’s liveli‐
hood (Slominski, 2016). My analysis identifies policy nar‐
ratives to then assess their evolution over time, deter‐
mine whether different narratives have been used by
different political parties, and to understand to what
extent polarisation has taken place. The next section
delves into the details and role of policy narratives.
3. Policy Narratives
The analysis of policy narratives can help explain under‐
lying rationales of policy choices and identify coalitions
and degrees of polarisation in a political arena. A nar‐
rative is a story that justifies policy positions by inter‐
preting reality in a certain way. Narratives play a role
in an actors’ processing and communication of informa‐
tion, and the construction of such a story can shape
an actor’s decisions and policy choices. Different policy
realities are thereby created when individuals or groups
attach different meanings to certain policies. In practice,
this is done when actors highlight certain aspects and
neglect others to sway the opinions of other actors to
support certain policy choices. Policy narratives are often
bound by ideologies and belief systems (McBeth et al.,
2014, pp. 229–230). While knowing a country’s policy
position does not necessarily reveal the reasons for the
choices made, analysing the narratives used in the politi‐
cal debate can uncover those rationales and perceptions.
For this reason, this article focuses on the climate policy
narratives that Polish parliamentarians and government
representatives construct in parliamentary debates.
The Narrative Policy Framework was developed
based on the observations above. This framework guides
the systematic analysis of narratives used by actors to
argue for their policy preferences (Shanahan et al., 2018).
A policy narrative generally has four elements (McBeth
et al., 2014, pp. 228–229):
a) The specific setting in which it is situated. This
refers to certain parameters such as geography,
economic conditions and other factors pertaining
to the policy problem. This setting can serve as a
policy narratives’ focal point.
b) Different characters figure in a narrative. These
characters include the hero who (tries to) solve
the problem, the villain who (allegedly) causes the
problem, the victim that is distressed by the villain
and helped by the hero, the opponent who rejects
the policy but is not a villain, and the ally who is
aligned with the hero.
c) The plot describes the relationship among the
characters and situates them within the setting.
d) The moral refers to the policy solution that a nar‐
rative promotes.
As a minimum, a policy narrative must at least have one
character and put forward a policy preference (moral;
Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 457).
Policy narratives operate simultaneously at the
micro, meso, andmacro level. Micro‐level analyses focus
on how individuals construct and are influenced by nar‐
ratives. Meso‐level research zooms into the deployment
of policy narratives by different groups, and macro‐level
studies focus on how narratives shape public policy
(McBeth et al., 2014, pp. 230–246). The focus of my
study on Poland’s climate policy debate is situated on the
meso level, identifying the policy narratives shared by dif‐
ferent groups of Polish politicians in parliament. I find
that actor groups strategically construct and communi‐
cate policy narratives to justify and reflect their shared
policy preferences and that groups with competing pol‐
icy preferences tend to construct competing narratives,
which emphasise different elements. By tracing differ‐
ent group’s policy narratives over time, possible policy
belief changes are detected, which can be induced for
example by changes in the setting (McBeth et al., 2014,
pp. 237–240).
Actors and groups can employ different policy nar‐
rative strategies. When they perceive themselves as
losing on an issue, actors tend to construct narratives
that expand the scope of the respective policy issue
to achieve results that are more favourable to them.
On the contrary, perceived winners strive to contain
the scope of a policy to maintain their benefit (Jones
& McBeth, 2010; McBeth et al., 2007). Narratives con‐
struct a causal story that strategically connects ele‐
ments to assign responsibility or blame. Moreover,
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policy narratives often villainise the opposition while
portraying the constructor of the narrative as a hero
(McBeth et al., 2014, pp. 241–242; Shanahan et al.,
2013). Identifying policy narratives and evaluating their
strength/dominance provides insights into the polarisa‐
tion among different groups. Additionally, understanding
the policy narratives used to construct political realities
helps explain policy processes and their outputs. The fol‐
lowing section describes how the Polish climate policy
narratives were identified.
4. Research Design and Methods
I employed a combination of inductive and deductive
content analysis of climate policy debates in the Polish
parliament’s lower house, the Sejm. The analysis spans
the period 2015–2020, which covers the entire eighth
Sejm legislative term and the first year of the ninth leg‐
islative term. Analysing the debates of 2020 is crucial for
an analysis of Polish perspectives on the EGD and the tur‐
bulence it stirred, since the Sejm debated EU‐level devel‐
opments such as the EGD and its Just Transition Fund.
Furthermore, analysing the eighth termprovides insights
into the Polish debate directly preceding the develop‐
ment of the EGD, which is important since adoption of
the EGD could have shaped subsequent Polish narratives
and positions. In short, this timeframe allows for an ana‐
lysis of whether and how the EGD created a turbulence
in Polish climate policy.
The analysis includes all Sejm plenary and com‐
mittee debates on national, EU, and international cli‐
mate policy which were identified through the Sejm
website’s search tool. A total of 165 speeches were
found. At times, a dialogue with multiple interven‐
tions by one speaker occurred, since many debates
had the form of an information session by a govern‐
ment representative to Members of Parliament (MPs).
In such cases, all interventions were grouped in one
document and counted as one speech. Annex I in the
Supplementary File provides an overview of all analysed
debates. The format of information sessions by the gov‐
ernment added a glimpse into the government’s per‐
spective to the analysis. All speeches were translated
into English by Polish native speakers. On this, since
I analysed whole arguments—rather than semantics—
translating the speeches was suitable.
A content analysis (Mayring, 2014) of all speeches
was conducted, using the qualitative content analysis
software NVivo (Jackson & Bazeley, 2019). The cod‐
ing proceeded in two steps. First, I thoroughly read all
speeches and took notes on recurring arguments and
narratives. Based on this first step, I identified differ‐
ent narratives and coded all speeches accordingly in
a second step. In several debates a minister or high‐
ranking government representative gave a longer speech
outlining the government’s position on the respective
topic. Some MPs asked questions rather than making
statements that revealed their point of view. In these
instances, questions were not coded. Instead, I only
coded statements in which MPs and government repre‐
sentatives took a position. NVivo allows for matrix cod‐
ing queries that relate the coded statements to specified
characteristics such as the speaker’s political affiliation
or the year in which the speech was given. This enables
the analysis of trends and patterns. Section 5 presents
the results of this empirical analysis.
5. Polish Climate Policy Narratives
Three distinct policy narratives could be identified that
transcend most of the analysed Sejm climate debates.
The first stresses Poland’s unique situation, which high‐
lights that the country’s situation is different from the
other EUmember states and claims that Poland requires
special consideration and financial support to (re)shape
its specific climate and energy policy. The second builds
on the first policy narrative and postulates that Poland
(needs to) pursue(s) a special pathway. Prior to 2019,
the described pathway was the continuation of using
coal while absorbing emissions through forests and tech‐
nological innovation. The policy narrative also stresses
Poland’s sovereignty in taking policy decisions, particu‐
larly with regards to its energy mix. The third narrative
portrays climate policy as a threat to (international) com‐
petitiveness and economic growth. Analysis of the dif‐
ferent narratives shows an incipient polarisation among
the political parties on climate policy in 2020. This sec‐
tion first describes each of the narratives before dis‐
cussing polarisation.
5.1. Poland is in a Unique Situation
A prominent narrative that transcends almost all debates
is the assertion that Poland is in a unique situation. This
was illustrated in a statement made by Michał Kurtyka
(non‐partisan), Minister of Climate and Environment,
at the 2020 debate on the EGD and Poland’s posi‐
tion: “All 28 countries agreed that we would move
towards climate neutrality for the continent, while at
the same time acknowledging—all of our 27 partners
recognised it—the uniqueness of Poland” (M. Kurtyka,
January 15, 2020). This narrative on Poland’s uniqueness
has translated into multiple calls for special considera‐
tion and more financial support for Poland from the EU.
Compared to previous years, this part of the policy nar‐
rative became much more prominent in the 2020 dis‐
cussions on the EGD and the Just Transition Fund. This
is illustrated, for instance, by MP Tomasz Piotr Nowak’s
(Civic Platform) intervention: “We should possibly veto or
threaten to veto the climate neutrality target to demand
more funds apart from the Just Transition Fund and
the Modernisation Fund for the transformation of the
Polish energy industry” (T. P. Nowak, December 9, 2020).
The individual references to the different narratives and
their elements over time are shown in Figure 1 (see also
Annex 2 in the Supplementary File).
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In this policy narrative, Poland is victimised as a coun‐
try that faces particularly great challenges conditioned
by its setting of a highly‐carbon intensive energy system.
The EU is not portrayed as a villain but rather as a char‐
acter who bears the responsibility to support the dis‐
tressed country of Poland. The claimof Poland’s uniquely‐
challenging situation is translated into a responsibility
for the EU/other EU member states to act in solidarity
of Poland. The proposed policy solution is to recognise
Poland’s uniqueness and to, therefore, increase (finan‐
cial) support. This narrative does not exclude Poland’s
willingness to change its energy system, but it has a pas‐
sive connotation, making change dependent on exter‐
nal support.
5.2. Poland Pursues a Different Pathway
Related to the narrative on Poland’s uniqueness is the
policy narrative on Poland pursuing a different pathway
to climate neutrality and safeguarding its sovereignty.
This narrative postulates that Poland can continue using
coal while absorbing emissions through technological
innovation and forests. In this context, several actors
refer to the Lisbon Treaty provision that reserves the
sovereign right for member states to determine their
energy mix (Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, 2009, Article 194). This narrative was illustrated
by MP Anna Paluch’s (PiS) statement at the 2020 debate
on a draft resolution announcing the climate emergency:
The implementation of the objectives of the low‐
carbon economy is one path, but the other path—the
one that Poland has been promoting for years […]—
is to strike a balance between anthropogenic green‐
house gas emissions and the absorption by biosys‐
tems. (A. Paluch, January 8, 2020)
Another example is: “I believe that coal does not con‐
tradict climate protection. Therefore, it is necessary to
implement a resource and energy economy in Poland
in which coal does not contradict climate protection.
Wewill have to invest in new coal technologies” (P. Sałek,
December 29, 2015). A number of politicians strongly
promote forests to absorb carbon, which was one of
the aspects that Poland promoted when hosting the
2018 COP: “Poland is a model in this respect… issues
related to the Polish model of forest management will
also be discussed” (J. Szyszko, November 25, 2015).
However, the analysis revealed that this policy narra‐
tive was strong before 2019 and faded away afterwards,
being replaced by the claim that Poland requires special
consideration and financial support, which is part of the
first narrative.
Poland’s right to pursue its own climate pathway is,
at several occasions, justified in reference to the Paris
Agreement. Politicians consider the wording of the Paris
Agreement that refers to net‐zero emissions and the
absences of the word decarbonisation a Polish success:
“There is nothing in the Paris Agreement about the fight
against coal. The word decarbonisation is absent. There
is only the so‐called climate neutrality, and that has been
preserved” (P. Sałek, December 29, 2015). Some actors
refer to the Paris Agreement as the agreement that binds
Poland, rather than EU‐level decisions:
As far as the source of the law is concerned, for Poles
the source of law is the Paris Agreement, because
this is an agreement that has been ratified by Poland.
Climate neutrality in the second half of the 21st cen‐
tury is part of the Paris Agreement. In the strictly
legalistic language, the Conclusions of the European
Council are not a source of law. The source of law
will be only the legal acts that will result from this.
(M. Kurtyka, January 15, 2020)
In 2020, an EU Climate Lawwas adopted, which changed
this line of argumentation by turning the EU climate
neutrality goal by 2050 into a binding obligation. This
EU‐level event coincidedwith the shift in Polish narrative
from the continuation of coal to conditional change.
This policy narrative emphasises Poland’s sover‐
eignty and aims to minimise the EU level’s role and influ‐
ence on Polish climate policy. It portrays Poland as a
hero who pursues its own pathway against the inter‐
ference from the villain EU. The narrative goes beyond
emphasising that Poland is in a difficult situation in
terms of the climate neutrality transition and rather out‐
lines a sovereign and distinct approach compared to its
EU partners. The reason for this different pathway is
again the setting of a highly carbon‐intensive energy sys‐
tem but also of the country’s unique (forest) resources.
In this narrative, the scope of the discussion on EU‐level
climate policy is expanded to include the option of GHG
sequestration through forests and innovation as an alter‐
native pathway to the decarbonisation promoted by the
EU. This expanded scope is deemed more favourable for
Poland. The proposed policy solution is that Poland takes
sovereign decisions. This emphasis on sovereigntymakes
the narrative more difficult to reconcile with the EGD.
Financial support from the Just Transition Mechanism
alone seems inadequately equipped to influence this pol‐
icy narrative and bring it in line with the EU’s objectives.
Yet, the shift away from the narrative of preserving the
status quo of coal usewhile absorbingGHGs, towards the
narrative which highlights the need for financial support
to transition, shows that positions have changed and
other options are now considered. However, the empha‐
sis on Poland’s distinctness remains.
5.3. Climate Policy Threatens Competitiveness
Overall, a third narrative runs through the debate, which
argues that climate policy threatens Polish and EU com‐
petitiveness and economic growth. EU‐level policy is por‐
trayed as harmful to the Polish economy:
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Figure 1. Individual references to the narrative over time (2015–2020).
I would like to emphasise the fact that the govern‐
ment is right to disagree with this type of restriction,
because our natural resource, which is coal, will suf‐
fer a great deal under this solution. I think that our
entire economy would slow down quite sharply if we
were to adapt to these requirements. (P. Olszówka,
February 8, 2017)
Further, several actors fear carbon leakage, which
describes the situation in which companies relocate to
outside of Europe where they are not covered by the
same rules, allowing them to continue emitting GHGs.
The analysis found that the narrative of climate policy
threatening competitiveness is predominantly used by
PiS politicians and to some extent by Polish People’s
Party (PSL) representatives, as shown in Figure 2. Yet,
the party is not entirely cohesive on this aspect. In the
debate on the results of the European Council summit
which took place on December 10–11, 2020, Konrad
Szymanski, Minister for European Affairs from the ruling
PiS party stated:
I think that throughout thewhole discussion on trans‐
formation, we should take into account not only the
costs of the transformation in themselves but also the
costs of the lack of transformation. I have the feeling
that this element is completelymissed and that there
is the impression that the lack of transformation gen‐
erates zero costs for the economy. (K. Szymanski,
December 16, 2020)
Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 1, many individual ref‐
erences continue using the policy narrative of climate
policy harming competitiveness in the 2020 debates.
While the quote above is an exception to this trend, it
could hint at a recognition of EGD policies by individual
politicians. Yet, drawing conclusions based on one quote
seems premature.
In this policy narrative, EU climate policies are vil‐
lainised as incurring a burden on and a disadvantage
for the Polish economy in the setting of a world that
does not follow the EU’s example of ambitious climate
policy. Poland is characterised as the victim of this pol‐
icy. The proposed policy solution is the lowering of the
EU’s level of ambition. However, another policy proposal
that could help address this narrative’s concerns is a
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as proposed by
the European Commission in the summer of 2021.
6. Polarisation
The three identified policy narratives are not put for‐
ward by all political parties alike and they do not con‐
stitute opposing narratives. Rather, the governing party
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Figure 2. Individual references to the narratives per political party (2015–2020).
PiS dominantly uses all three narratives. This higher num‐
ber of individual references is not surprising since PiS
has more representatives in parliament than the other
parties. In the ninth legislative term, it counted 198 of
460MPs and its electoral coalition United Right 235MPs,
which was almost the same in the eighth term. Yet, it is
surprising that no distinct opposition narrative was iden‐
tified. Certainly, in the eighth Sejm legislative term, no
clear polarisation trends could be identified, confirming
earlier findings by Marcinkiewicz and Tosun (2015). Yet,
in 2020 the picture slightly changed. On the one hand,
two opposition party coalitions each submitted a draft
resolution on the climate crisis and climate emergency,
on which a polarised debate took place. One resolution
was introduced by the Left (centre‐left political parties)
and the other one by Civic Coalition (centre‐right politi‐
cal parties). The Civic Coalition resolution included a cli‐
mate neutrality target by 2040 and the Left resolution
by 2050. In the debate on the draft resolutions, polarisa‐
tion between the government party (PiS) and other right‐
wing parties, on the one hand, and the Civic Coalition and
the Left, on the other, was evident.Most statements that
Poland should adoptmore ambitious climate policy were
made in 2020 by a growing number of political parties.
As mentioned above, the narrative claiming that cli‐
mate policy threatens economic competitiveness was
predominantly used by PiS MPs. In 2020, a counter‐
narrative highlighting that Poland could gain competitive‐
ness through climate policy emerged, and was used by
a few Civic Platform MPs. It emphasised the need for
investments.Moreover, some Civic Platform, Democratic
Left Alliance (SLD; since 2020, New Left), Nowoczesna,
and Green MPs called for more ambitious climate policy
(see Figure 2). This points to a change in Polish climate
policy of earlier periods. It shows nascent polarisation
on climate policy between the right‐wing political parties,
on the one hand, and the centre‐right and centre‐left par‐
ties, on the other.
7. Conclusions
In EU climate debates, Poland has opposed decisions
to increase the Union’s level of ambition at multiple
occasions, creating political turbulence at the EU level.
Poland’s position can be linked to three distinct narra‐
tives that I detected in the national parliamentary cli‐
mate debate: First, politicians perceive Poland as being in
a unique situation, which requires solidarity and recogni‐
tion by the other EU member states. Second, politicians
advocate for Poland to pursue an alternative pathway,
which combines the continued use of coal with emis‐
sion capture through forests and technological innova‐
tion. In this second narrative, the country’s sovereignty
is emphasised. Third, climate policy is described as detri‐
mental to economic competitiveness. The EGD and its
Just Transition Mechanism respond to the first narra‐
tive, by recognising Poland’s challenges in transitioning
to climate neutrality and supporting it in this process.
The other two narratives are, however, more difficult to
reconcile with the EGD.
Despite this, the analysis shows that the alternative
pathway narrative faded at roughly the same time as the
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EGD was proposed at the EU level, while the unique situ‐
ation narrative simultaneously became stronger. Before
2019/2020, the narrative defending and preserving the
status quo and emphasising that Poland is active on
climate policy—just differently than the others—was
strong. With the EGD, the narrative shifted towards call‐
ing for recognition of Poland’s uniqueness in combina‐
tion with increased (financial) support. Nascent polar‐
isation was noticed at this same time. While it is not
possible to make causal claims based on the narrative
analysis, the correlation suggests that the EGD has con‐
tributed to creating some turbulence in the Polish cli‐
mate debate. Other factors such as public opinion, the
need to modernise the electricity system, and weather
extremes seem likely additional factors amplifying a pos‐
sible EGD turbulence.
Turbulence is an event that is “highly variable, incon‐
sistent, unexpected or unpredictable” (Dobbs et al.,
2021, p. 317). The EGD constitutes what Dobbs et al.
(2021) label a policy turbulence, which consists of
the adoption of a fundamentally new policy that has
changed, to some extent, the parameters and expec‐
tations based on which EU member states make their
climate policy. The narrative shift that was noted in
the 2020 Sejm debate hints at this. The design of how
the EGD “governs with turbulence” (Dobbs et al., 2021,
p. 317) is of course not the result of a unidirectional pro‐
cess from the EU to Poland. The Polish position and nar‐
ratives also have left an imprint on the EGD. Nonetheless,
the European Commission’s proposal and resolve to
increase climate ambition and integrate it in many
other policy fields has received a noticeable response in
the Polish parliamentary debate. Future research could
delve into the causal links between the EGD and changes
in Polish climate policy narratives and positions, identify‐
ing to what extent it created a turbulence.
EU climate policy is based on decarbonisation, which
includes abandoning the use of coal. This is diametrically
opposed to the narrative of Poland’s pathway that con‐
tinues to rely on coal. The Just Transition Mechanism
aims to soften opposition to exiting coal by aiming to
create alternative economic opportunities for affected
communities. A stronger local narrative on the oppor‐
tunities could help counter the alternative pathway nar‐
rative. This links to Zuk and Szulecki’s (2020, p. 9) con‐
clusion that energy transition in Poland is not only a
technological and financial issue. Rather, it relates to
cultural, ideological, and political problems. EU finan‐
cial support would need to be part of a mix of mea‐
sures, which addresses ideological and related aspects
of Polish decarbonisation to persuade Polish actors to get
on board. This also links to the third narrative on compet‐
itiveness in that a counter‐narrative on the opportunities
created through climate policy could support just transi‐
tion finances. First signs of such a counter‐narrative have
been noted in the 2020 debates.
The introduction of new funds like the Just Transition
Fund aims at supporting Polish and other EU mem‐
ber state coal regions. By making the climate neutral‐
ity transition fairer and more inclusive, the European
Commission aims to generatemore support for the ambi‐
tious EU climate targets as set out in the EGD. My ana‐
lysis shows that there is some receptiveness to this
development. However, narratives highlighting Poland’s
sovereignty in taking energy‐related decisions and por‐
traying climate policy as detrimental to economic com‐
petitiveness are difficult to changewith financial support
alone. Engagement, recognition, and counter‐narratives
seem good complementary measures. My analysis
shows signs of polarisation among political parties. Very
few MPs used an emergent counter‐narrative highlight‐
ing that low‐carbon investments can generate economic
growth. Climate policy has, to a limited extent, become
an arena for party competition.
As such, my qualitative analysis of Polish climate pol‐
icy narratives has shown that support for or opposition
to EU‐level climate policy can be justified with very differ‐
ent stories. Depending on the prevailing narrative, the EU
reaction needs to be different. This article constitutes a
first step to understanding the role of climate policy nar‐
ratives in the interaction between the EU and itsmember
states and how policy narrative analysis can help align
both levels’ policies.
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